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USING MATHEMATICAL MODELS IN A UNIFIED 
APPROACH TO PREDICTING THE NEXT EMERGING 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
Tiffany L. Bogich, Kevin 1. Olival, Parviez R. Hosseini, Car]os 
Zambrana-Torrelio, Elizabeth Loh, Sebastian Funk, Ilana L. 
Brito, Jonathan H. Epstein, John S. Brownstein, Damien O. 
Joly, Marc A. Levy, Kate E. Jones, Stephen S. Morse, A. Alonso 
Aguirre, William B. Karesh, Jonna A. K. Mazet, and Peter Daszak 
Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) pose a signifi-
cant threat to human health, global economies, and 
conservation (Smolinski et al. 2003). They are defined 
as diseases that have recently increased in incidence 
(rate of the development of new cases during a given 
time period), are caused by pathogens that recently 
moved from one host population to another, have 
recently evolved, or have recently exhibited a change in 
pathogenesis (Morse 1993; Krause 1994). Some EIDs 
threaten global public health through pandemics with 
large-scale mortality (e.g., HN/AIDS). Others cause 
smaller outbreaks but have high case fatality ratios 
or lack effective therapies or vaccines (e.g. Ebola virus 
or methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus). As a 
group, EIDs cause hundreds of thousands of deaths 
each year, and some outbreaks (e.g., SARS, H5N1) 
have cost the global economy tens of billions of 
dollars. Emerging diseases also affect plants, live-
stock, and wildlife and are recognized as a Significant 
threat to the conservation of biodiversity (Daszak 
et al. 2000). Approximately 60% of emerging human 
disease events are zoonotic, and over 75% of these 
diseases originate in wildlife (Jones et al. 2008). The 
global response to such epidemics is frequently reac-
tive, and the effectiveness of conventional disease 
control operations is often "too little, too late': With 
rising globalization, the ease with which diseases 
spread globally has increased dramatically in recent 
times. Also, interactions between humans and wildlife 
have intensified through trade markets, agricultural 
intensification, logging and mining, and other forms 
of development that encroach into wild areas. Rapid 
human population growth, land use change, and 
change in global trade and travel require a shift toward 
a proactive, predictive, and preventive approaches for 
the next zoonotic pandemic. 
The key emergence event for most infectious dis-
eases is a change in transmission dynamics within or 
between host populations. The interconnectedness 
of humans, domestic animals, and wildlife facilitates 
the spillover of pathogens between hosts (Daszak 
et al. 2000). External forces, such as agricultural 
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intensification, global travel, and the accidental trans-
location of pathogens, augment this interaction. The 
role of zoonotic pathogens in causing human dis-
ease may be particularly important because when 
these diseases first emerge, humans have no acquired 
immunity to novel pathogens, resulting in sometimes 
highly lethal infections (e.g., AIDS/HIV, Ebola virus 
disease). 
Despite the huge social, demographic, and eco-
nomic impact of EIDs, there has been little advance-
ment in understanding how anthropogenic changes 
drive disease emergence and in developing proactive, 
predictive, and preventive approaches (Hufnagel et al. 
2004; Weiss and McMichael 2004; Ferguson et al. 
2005; Wolfe et al. 200S). In this chapter, we describe 
a strategy to create a unifying predictive model for 
the zoonotic and pandemic potential of a given region 
by integrating predictive models of each stage of 
the process of zoonotic disease emergence. The three 
stages of emergence that we address are (1) a "pre-
emergence" phase, where anthropogenic changes 
cause animal populations to come into contact, lead-
ing to cross-species transmission of their pathogens, 
(2) a spillover stage, where animal pathogens enter 
human populations, and (3) pandemic emergence, 
where pathogens are able to exploit human travel and 
trade networks to emerge across international and 
regional boundaries. Each stage of the emergence 
process requires a different approach and analyses at 
different scales. Each of these modeling exercises is 
then linked to data collection on the ground. Models 
are then parameterized through effective active and 
passive surveillance of wildlife, monitoring of key-
words in media, and analysis of published literature. 
This modeling approach also helps to increase 
surveillance efficiency by facilitating spatial and spe-
cies-specific (e.g., phylogenetic) targeting of wildlife 
to sample for likely zoonotic pathogens. Our strategy 
is designed for the early detection of novel pathogens 
with human pandemic potential, to allow animal and 
human health professionals the opportunity to pre-
dict emergence and prevent spread. It also provides 
the tools to target important sentinel species at active 
human interfaces to improve on the efficiencies of 
previous surveillance for rare pathogens of interest. 
Our vision is to expand on lessons learned in order to 
better assess local capacity, increase the value ofinfec-
tious disease modeling, implement targeted and adap-
tive wildlife disease surveillance systems, develop and 
deliver new technologies to improve efforts in hotspots, 
and use cutting-edge information management and 
communication tools to bring the world closer to real-
izing an integrated, globalized approach to controlling 
emerging zoonotic diseases. 
In this chapter, we focus in particular on three key 
steps in designing this integrated modeling and field 
surveillance approach: (1) the selection of geographic 
sites for surveillance, (2) the selection of target species 
for sampling, and (3) the construction of predictive 
models of spread and future emergence (Table 42.1). 
DEFL"'ITIONS, DRl VERS, 
AND ErASES 
History and Debate over the Definition 
of an EID 
In the introduction to this chapter, we defined EIDs 
as diseases that have recently increased in incidence, 
have moved from one host population to another, are 
caused by recently evolved strains, or exhibit a change 
in pathogenesis. We use this definition because, 
despite the widely accepted importance of EIDs, 
there is little agreement on the exact properties that 
classify a disease as "emerging:' While the term has 
generally been used to emphasize the novelty of a 
given infectious disease, closer inspection reveals that 
there is no consensus on what defines this novelty. 
With an increasing number of studies investigating 
the phenomenon of emergence and the underlying 
environmental and anthropogenic drivers (e.g., Taylor 
et al. 2001; Jones et al. 2008), it is important to agree 
on a medically and biologically meaningful definition 
of emergence. Such a definition should, in principle, 
allow one to decide not only whether a given infec-
tious disease can be called "emerging", but also when 
and where exactly it emerged, and to do so via rigor-
ous and quantifiable criteria. 
The first mention of EIDs that can be found on 
MEDLINE was provided by Oster (1961), who con-
centrated solely on animal diseases but supplied a 
definition that can be generalized to human diseases. 
He describes the "sudden invasion by epizootic dis-
eases into countries where they have never before 
struck" and mentions that these "have been described 
as 'emerging diseases; a new term which would seem 
to indicate new infectious disease situations." 
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Table 42.1 Summary of Questions, Approaches, and Results Related to Three Components ofEID 
Surveillance and Prediction 
Objective Questions Approach Result 
l. Selecting - What is the risk of transmission to humans? Spatial and - Geographically refined 
geographic - What is the distribution of undiscovered temporal surveillance 
sites for pathogens? What areas have been general strategies 
surveillance undersampled? linear - Refined "hotspot" 
- What are the spatial drivers of disease models maps 
emergence? - Sub-regional "hotspot" 
- How will the risk of disease emergence maps 
change geographically? 
2. Selecting - Which wildlife species are the greatest risk Spatial and - Refined surveillance 
species for of being the source for zoonotic disease temporal strategies according 
sampling emergence? general to phylogenetic 
linear models relatedness and 
contact opportunities 
3. Predicting - Can the potential of a region to produce Matrix-based - A global emerging 
spread and pandemic pathogens be measured? population infectious disease 
future - Can the vulnerability of a region to the simulation vulnerability map 
emergence spread of an BID be determined? 
events 
There are two ways in which a disease can be con-
sidered new (Table 42.2). In the first instance, the 
definition can be relatively specific. A disease may be 
"emerging" in that it has crossed the species barrier to 
infect a novel host, or that its clinical signs or symp-
toms or pathogenicity has changed. In other words, 
the disease is genuinely new to a host. In this sense, 
every disease can emerge only once in each host. Some 
diseases, such as measles (Babbott and Gordon 1954), 
sleeping sickness (Steverding 2008), and bubonic 
plague (Hays 2006), emerged in prehistoric or ancient 
times, whereas others, such as Ebola virus (World 
Health Organization 1978), Nipah virus (Chua et al. 
2000), and SARS (Guan et al. 2003), emerged in 
recent years. 
Some authors, on the other hand, have proposed 
defining BIDs in the wider purview of all diseases that 
are increasing in incidence (Institute of Medicine 
1992; Morse 1993; Levins et al.1994; Morse 1995; Jones 
et al. 2008). This approach includes not only diseases 
that are genuinely new in a host and are increasing in 
incidence by virtue of being recognized in the first 
place, but also diseases that were previously present at 
a lower level or are expanding to new areas. In this 
sense, a disease can emerge and re-emerge multiple 
times and in different locations. 
With increasing interest in emerging infectious dis-
eases, it is important to agree on the meaning of the 
term, which has been used for a variety of different and 
sometimes seemingly unrelated phenomena. In previ-
ous definitions, it has been interpreted in two ways: as 
the appearance of a new pathogen in humans or as a dis-
ease becomes a growing concern. These two scenarios 
can be distinguished by differentiating between primary 
and secondary emergence. For this chapter, we limit our 
focus to those EIDs that can infect humans. On the 
basis of the distinction between primary and secondary 
emergence, the following definitions are proposed for 
an emerging infectious disease (Table 42.2): 
• Primary emergence: A novel infectious disease 
appears in humans by means of transmission from 
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Table 42.2 Previous Definitions ofEIDs 
Primary Emergence Secondary Emergence 
New host New symptoms Detection Increased Expansion 
incidence 
Oster (1961) 
Lederberg et al. (1992) 
Morse (1993) 
Levins et al. (1994) 
Morse (1995) 
Garnett and Holmes (1996) 
Kilbourne (1996) 
Included factors of primary emergence were crossing of the species barrier to adapt to a new host (humans), the appearance of new symptoms 
or new pathogenicity, and new detection of a disease. Included factors of secondary emergence were an increase in incidence and expansion to 
a new area. Morse (1995) lists the appearance of an infection "for the first time" as emergence, which fits all categories of primary emergence, 
without being explicit about the mechanisms. 
animals or the environment and adaptation to 
infecting humans, or through evolution within 
human hosts to develop new pathogenicity or 
resistance to treatment. In this case the first 
recorded cluster in humans is taken as the EID 
event. If an earlier case than the previously earliest 
known case is found retrospectively (as has 
happened for HIV), the timing of the event 
should be corrected accordingly. 
Secondary emergence: An existing infectious 
disease increases in incidence in a population in a 
way that constitutes a significant change with 
respect to a baseline incidence. This is the case 
when a disease occurs where it has never 
previously been reported (and the baseline 
incidence was zero), or when a disease displays a 
trend of increasing incidence with respect to a 
non-zero incidence. The timing of the emergence 
event, in this case, should be the beginning of the 
increase. 
Characterizing the Drivers 
of Emergence 
Despite the threat posed by EIDs, we still do not fully 
understand the mechanism of emergence; instead, we 
rely heavily on a reactive approach of responding to 
pathogens after they have emerged. We must first take 
a broad-scale, ecological approach to understanding 
the processes driving emergence. The process of 
disease emergence is complex and generally driven 
by factors that "provide conditions that allow for a 
select pathogen to expand and adapt to a new niche" 
(Smolinski et al. 2003). These factors are largely envi-
ronmental, ecological, political, economic, and social 
forces, which function on a range of different scales. 
During the past two decades, numerous studies have 
classified emerging diseases according to the factors 
underlying their emergence, commonly referring to 
these factors or processes as drivers of emergence. 
The first attempt to classify drivers of emergence 
was published by the Institute of Medicine (10M) 
in 1992 (Lederberg et al. 1992). This report identi-
fied six factors in the emergence of infectious diseases: 
(1) human demographics and behavior; (2) technol-
ogy and industry; (3) economic development and land 
use; (4) international travel and commerce; (5) micro-
bial adaptation and change; and (6) breakdown of 
public health measures. These factors are not mutually 
exclusive and are relevant to different stages of emer-
gence (e.g., spillover or an increase in incidence). 
Seven additional drivers were added in a follow-up 
10M report in 2003 (Smolinski et al. 2003): "human 
susceptibility to infection," "climate and weather,· 
"changing ecosystems;' "poverty and social inequi~· 
"war and famine," "lack of political will;' and "intent to 
harm:' Other studies have found that disease emer-
gence from animal hosts to humans is driven mainly 
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by anthropogenic forces, such as land use change (Patz 
et al. 2004) or global trade and travel across ecological 
and environmental boundaries (Hufnagel et aI. 2004). 
The classification of these "factors in emergence" 
paved the way for research with respect to the under-
lying drivers of infectious disease emergence. 
At larger spatial scales, datasets are freely available 
for many of these drivers (e.g., human population den-
sity or land use change). Analyzing these datasets 
allows us to move beyond a correlative approach for 
testing drivers of disease to a predictive framework 
(jones et al. 2008; Dunn et al. 2010). Datasets for each 
driver are often correlated, so it is important to check 
for independence among variables when using multi-
ple driver datasets in a single analysis. Determining, 
quantifying, and ranking drivers of emergence at 
smaller spatial scales can be more complicated. Often 
an emergence event arises from multiple drivers inter-
acting simultaneously or sequentially. Further, the 
time lag between the driver acting directly on a host, 
pathogen, or environment and the origin of the emer-
gence event can vary. The duration of this time lag may 
scale with organism generation time; for example, a 
driver acting directly on pathogens (short generation 
time) would have a much smaller lag in effect than a 
driver acting on a mammalian host species (longer 
generation time). 
The spread of genetically based resistance will 
always lag behind the emergence of a pathogen and 
may be affected by other drivers. One could estimate a 
probability curve for this, and estimate lag time based 
on the slope of the curve. While drivers of emergence 
are indeed complicated, we can still make inferences 
on the role of multiple drivers acting simultaneously 
or sequentially, the time lag between drivers and 
emergence, and the possibility of unintentional driv-
ers, those that were originally thought to be mitigating 
forces. 
Quantifying Missing Reports and 
Biases in Reporting 
EXisting datasets have identified over 3SO infec-
tious diseases that have emerged in the past 70 years 
(Woolhouse and Gaunt 2007; Jones et al. 2008; Dunn 
et al. 2010). It is likely, however, that there have 
been numerous unreported cases of novel diseases. 
Whether the numbers of emerging infectious dis-
eases are on the rise or health officials have merely 
grown more aware of these events is debatable and 
can only be estimated against the backdrop of the 
highly uneven surveillance capabilities across the 
globe. EID surveillance has become a high-priority 
issue for both local and global health authorities, 
thereby making reporting more equitable. Thorough, 
accurate disease surveillance reporting relies on 
comprehensive, unbiased participation of all national 
and sub-national health agencies. This has been 
highlighted in recent years by the SARS epidemic, 
HSNI highly pathogenic avian influenza, the global 
HINI influenza pandemic, and, most poignantly, ilie 
ongoing HIV pandemic. 
These diseases, whose spread may have at one 
time been constrained locally, are increasingly tran-
scending national boundaries (Institute of Medicine 
2009). Local outbreaks are of concern to the global 
community because of their potential for pervasive 
spread. We rely on human reports of these types of 
local events to detect epidemics with pandemic poten-
tial that require global action. However, this type 
of participatory reporting is incomplete and biased 
due to an uneven distribution of health systems, detec-
tion mechanisms, and communication infrastructure. 
Disincentives to reporting, such as negative political 
and economic consequences of control measures, 
may also result in reporting bias. When trying to 
determine the underlying drivers for global disease 
emergence events, the source of biases in reporting 
must be accounted for to ensure that true differences 
are reported rather ilian artifacts of sampling or 
reporting. 
A number of factors may affect the probability 
of detecting novel BIDs or influence the lag time 
between infection and detection of a novel pathogen. 
Factors intrinsic to both the pathogen and the exposed 
individual-such as ilie pathogen's virulence and the 
individual's socioeconomic status-will determine 
whether the individual seeks medical attention and 
whether the medical examiner identifies the infection 
as novel. Unusually infectious or virulent pathogens 
may have a greater chance of being reported due to 
large numbers of infected individuals or more detri-
mental health effects. Long latency periods, during 
which individuals are asymptomatic, lead to temporal 
biases due to the lag time between the initial case and 
detection, as was the case with variant Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease and HN / AIDS, which is suspected 
to have emerged in the United States more than a 
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decade before it was identified in 1981 (Gilbert et al. 
2007). 
Socioeconomic factors also playa role both as a 
driver of disease emergence and as a source of report-
ing bias. Lower-income countries have higher rates of 
malnutrition and reduced access to potable drinking 
water, sanitation, immunizations, and health services 
(Ruger and Kim 2006; World Health Organization 
2010). Furthermore, many low-income countries, par-
ticularly in sub-Saharan Mrica, are faced with double-
digit HIV infection rates. These populations are 
more susceptible to EIDs due to greater exposure to 
infective agents and depressed immunity. Whether or 
not infected individuals in low-income countries 
receive medical attention depends also on the avail-
ability, accessibility, and appropriateness of medical 
services and the individual overall ability to use them 
(Ensor and Cooper 2004). GDP and population den-
sity are the strongest correlates with the supply of 
qualified medical staff, healthcare facilities, diagnos-
tics, and treatments (World Health Organization 
2010 ). 
The first step in correcting for this reporting bias 
of EIDs is to identify the sources for potential bias 
in the data. Then, proxies may be determined that help 
account for this non-random bias (i.e., distance to 
nearest hospital, use of traditional medicine, or per 
capita spending on healthcare). Reporting of disease 
is also non-random throughout the world because of 
local capacity to conduct and publish research, and 
the dearth of investigation taking place in underdevel-
oped and hard-to-reach areas. To control for this when 
building their model of global EID risk, Jones et al. 
(2008) constructed an index of sampling bias based 
on author addresses of publications in the Journal of 
InfectiOUS Disease from 1973 to 2008. 
Caution must be taken in choosing potential data-
sets to act as proxies for bias measures. There must be 
quantification or evidence supporting a mechanistic 
link between the proxy and the outcome. Using this 
approach, we posit that the number of infectious dis-
eases to have emerged over the past half-century is 
likely much greater than we had previously anticipated. 
Others have also suggested that recent exposure events 
are more common, as a result of more suboptimal 
attempts by pathogens to invade novel populations in 
the past-sometimes termed "viral chatter" (Antia 
et al. 2003; Woolhouse et al. 2005; Wolfe et al. 2007). 
SITE SELECTIO"J. SPECIES 
SELECTlOK, AND PREDICTIVE 
MODELfKG 
Select Geographic Sites for 
Surveillance 
Jones et al. (2008) provided an example of a compre-
hensive approach to identifying sites as priority areas 
for sampling for the next EIDs. These sites have been 
dubbed "hotspots" and represent areas of higher ErD 
risk. This process of identifying EID hotspots began 
with an exhaustive literature search to collect biologi-
cal, temporal, and spatial data for EID "events" in 
human populations between 1940 and present. Jones 
et al. (2008) based their database of EIDs on previous 
work (Taylor et al. 2001) and updated it with addi-
tional information on microbial pathogens. All types 
of pathogens found in humans were entered into 
the database, including sexually transmitted diseases 
(STDs), zoonoses, drug-resistant microbes, vector-
borne diseases, and food- and water-borne infections. 
Information on time, location, pathogen type, trans-
mission mode, other hosts, and pathogen life history 
traits was added. Further, the most commonly cited 
causes of emergence for each pathogen were deter-
mined (Daszak et al. 2000; Smolinski et al. 2003; 
Morens et al. 2004; Patz et al. 2004; Weiss and 
McMichael 2004). Finally, shape files defining the 
published boundaries of the initial emergence event 
were created in ArcGIS (ESRI 2005). 
The final published database covered global events 
between 1940 and 2004 and reported 335 EID events 
in humans. Using these 335 EID events, a risk model 
was constructed using logistic regression to deter-
mine the probability of an EID event in every I-degree 
grid cell of the world. These estimates are based on 
historical patterns of EID events and their environ-
mental and biological drivers (including human pop-
ulation density and growth, mammal diversity, 
precipitation, temperature, latitude, and reporting 
effort). Then, an EID risk value was calculated for 
every I-degree grid cell of the world using human pop-
ulation density and growth, mammal density, latitude, 
and rainfall with the coefficients of the multivariate 
logistic regression model (Jones et al. 2008). 
Previous efforts to understand patterns of 
EIDs have highlighted viral pathogens (particularly 
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negative-stranded RNA viruses) as a major threat 
because of their high rates of nucleotide substitution, 
often poor copy-editing, and higher capacity to adapt 
to new hosts (higher "evolvability"j Burke 1998). 
However,Jones et al. (2008) found that a majority of 
EID pathogens were bacterial, specifically novel drug-
resistant strains. Controlling for reporting effort, the 
number of EIDs still showed a highly significant rela-
tionship with time (generalized linear model with 
Poisson errors, offset by 10g(JID articles) (GLMp,]ID)' 
F"" = 96.4, P < 0.001), supporting the widespread 
claim that the threat ofEIDs to global health is increas-
ing (Fauci 2001j Smolinski et al. 2003j Morens et al. 
2004j King et al. 2006). Even after controlling for 
reporting effort, the number ofEID events originating 
in wildlife reached the highest proportion in the most 
recent decade, highlighting the importance of under-
standing the factors that increase the contact between 
wildlife and humans in developing any predictive 
model. The strong relationship between high wildlife 
host biodiversity-primarily found in low-latitude 
developing countries-and EID events caused by 
zoonotic pathogens from wildlife (e.g., SARS, Ebola) 
suggests that these geographic regions will continue 
to be a key source of novel EIDs in the future. It also 
reinforces the need for pathogen surveillance in wild 
animal populations as a forecasting measure for EIDs 
(Karesh and Cook 2005j Kuiken et al. 2005j King et al. 
2006). Jones et al. (2008) found that areas of the 
planet with the greatest EID risk also had the lowest 
levels of surveillance effort, therefore highlighting the 
importance of this approach for public health resource 
allocation. 
We have since updated the driver data and spatial 
resolution of the risk model in Jones et al. (2008). The 
original spatial resolution was approximately lOO-km' 
grid cells of the worldj using the native resolution of 
the driver datasets, we have reduced this resolution to 
1 km', allOWing for country-level EID risk maps to be 
drawn at a resolution useful for regional-level plan-
ning. Mammal diversity per l-km' grid cell was calcu-
lated using range maps based on Mammal Species 
of the World 2005. Human population density and 
growth were updated according to the Global Rural-
Urban Mapping Project and the Gridded Population 
of the World (http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/ gpw). 
At the global scale, the l-km risk map was developed 
using the same model coefficients as in Jones et al. 
(2008), but incorporates new driver datasets as 
described above at their native resolution, so the 
distribution of wildlife zoonotic EID risk (Fig. 42.1) 
is qualitatively comparable to that of the original 
risk map. At the country level, the improved datasets 
allow us to examine the influence of the two main 
drivers, mammal diversity and human population 
density, on EID risk. 
EID risk maps can allow us to select sites for sam-
pling that we believe to be more likely to harbor the 
next EID-causing pathogen in wildlife. We can also 
test the hotspots model by sampling in paired "hot" 
and "cold" sites. This allows for the constant feedback 
of field data into models to revise and update the 
prediction ofEID risk. 
Seleet Species to Target for Sampling 
Life-History Tralts 
Species are not equal in their ability to harbor and 
transmit infectious diseases. For example, there is 
some debate as to whether certain characteristics 
of bats (e.g., their longevity, colonial roosting habits, 
and ability to fly and hibernate) may make them better 
viral reservoirs than otrer groups of mammals (see 
Chapter 14 in this book). A recent analysis of bat 
hosts and viruses (Turmelle and Oliva12009) shows 
that some species in a given area will be more likely 
to harbor a greater number of viruses than others, and 
that population genetic structure (F Syj related to migra-
tory capacity and mixing of genetic populations) sig-
nificantly correlates with their known viral diversity. 
F Sy is a measure of the genetic mixture of individuals 
between populations. Turmelle and Olival (2009) used 
a combined model that includes FsT' the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) species 
threat status, and a measure of research sampling bias, 
and found that these variables account for 33% of 
known viral diversity in bats (p = 0.02). Approaches 
similar to this, which account for species-specific 
ecological and evolutionary traits, may be useful 
for identifying species with the highest projected 
pathogen viral richness. We can combine this 
approach with a geographically targeted one to iden-
tify the most cost-effective species (bats and other 
species) and locations to target for active wildlife 
surveillance. 
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Global map of zoonotic emerging disease hotspots risk from wildlife based on the Jones et al. (2008) model and updated 
mammal diversity and human population density and growth driver datasets. Risk is given by a scale from low (0.00, white) 
to high (1.00, black) risk. 
Ph;r logenetic Relatedness 
Another factor in the process of emergence is host 
relatedness with humans. Potential similarities that 
arise from shared ancestry, such as receptors that allow 
a virus to enter a cell, may playa major role in facilitat-
ing spillover of pathogens. To date, this assumption 
has not been explicitly tested in a phylogenetic frame-
work, especially fo r viruses. Using host and pathogen 
data from the Jones et al. (2008) database, we have 
examined the distribution of wildlife and domestic 
hosts for pathogens known to cause human disease. 
Mammals appear to host the greatest proportion of 
pathogens emerging from wildlife to infect humans 
(Fig. 42.2) . We constructed a database of all known 
mammal-virus associations to test the importance 
of phylogeny in estimating the probability of a virus 
being shared between a non-human mammalian 
host and humans. The final mammal-virus associa-
tion database consisted of over 1,200 pairs, including 
over 300 unique mammal species and over 200 
unique virus species. We also tested whether the prob-
ability of a virus being shared between mammal hosts 
and humans increased with increasing human-host 
contact. 
After correcting for biases in reporting effort, we 
found that the probability of humans and non-human 
mammal hosts sharing a virus increased with increas-
ing phylogenetic relatedness. Further, the probability 
of humans and non-human mammal hosts sharing a 
virus also increased with increasing contact opportu-
nity, either through domestication or shared habitat. 
These results, combined with life-history trait target-
ing and hotspot mapping, improve our understanding 
of host-pathogen transmission and help to provide 
basic guidance in the identification of wildlife species 
most likely to be the source of the next EID in humans. 
This understanding lays the groundwork for us to 
begin to predict the consequences of anthropogenic 
activities that increase interaction between humans, 
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Figure 42.2: 
The number of human EID events identified by Jones et al. 
(2008) by host species, as recorded in the original database. 
Mammals are responsible for by far the greatest number of 
human EIDs recorded thus far. 
domestic animals, and wildlife, such as logging, hunt-
ing, or building roads. 
Future research is also necessary to understand 
the relative importance of host phylogeny versus con-
tact opportunity with humans. This will allow for a 
better surveillance strategy that targets wildlife and 
domestic host species most likely to be the source of 
the next EID in humans. Using the model of phyloge-
netic relatedness and contact opportunities described, 
these findings could be advanced further by using a 
Gap Analysis, a tool used to assess decision-making in 
conservation to identify areas that have been under-
sampled for pathogens relative to mammalian (and 
phylogenetic) diversity. 
Contact Opportunities and Risk Interfaces 
Human contact with wildlife species, both direct and 
indirect, is undoubtedly an important factor in the 
transmission and emergence of new human pathogens 
from wildlife. High-risk contact interfaces could be 
the starting point for investigating pathogen diversity 
and prevalence (total number of cases of a disease in a 
population at a given time) in wildlife. Using estimates 
of the range and distribution of pathogen prevalence 
and incidence of every known EID family, we can use 
power calculations to look at how many individuals of 
each reservoir species need to be sampled within a 
given set of species in a specific interface. Calculating 
an expected prevalence of known EID families 
allows us to recognize unusual events during routine 
sampling. 
Our vision is that sampling of high-risk inter-
faces could be conducted over multiple seasons to 
obtain a baseline species diversity dataset. Then teams 
can determine the number of individuals per species 
needed for sampling to increase detection probability 
using estimated prevalence values for known patho-
gens (see Chapter 39 in this book). Next, a set of target 
species in the risk interface could be sampled, using 
the minimum number of individuals required for 
improved detection. Then if the prevalence is unusu-
ally high, teams could conduct follow-up sampling of 
species identified and appropriate potential spillover 
hosts, in intact or native range where possible. 
Construct Predictive Models of Spread 
and Future Emergence 
Finally, once we have a good grasp of historical disease 
data, current disease risk, and the socioeconomic, 
environmental, and biodiversity profile of a given 
region, we can analyze the likelihood that a given 
pathogen could break out and become trulypandemic 
(as defined by cross-continental transmission). Our 
group has developed a vulnerability map of this 
type for avian influenza (Hosseini et al. 2010) that 
examined travel routes, airplane travel capacity, and 
connections between all major airports using ten years 
of information from Freedom of Information Act 
requests to the u.s. Fish and Wildlife Service on the 
global wildlife trade, trade data from the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, and data 
from the International Airline Transport Alliance. 
Trade routes, export and import statistics, travel, and 
wildlife trade patterns were examined to determine 
how these factors increase the risk of HINI spreading 
from a hotspot region into major global population 
centers. This model can be generalized to the country 
and airport level to determine which locations are 
most vulnerable to importation ofEIDs through trade 
and travel (Hosseini et al. 2010). This methodology 
could be crucial for identifying airports or transporta-
tion centers where pathogen monitoring and inter-
vention will be particularly effective in preventing 
disease spread. 
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TECHNOLOGICAL ADVA~CES 
Recent technological advances have improved our 
ability to identify high-risk interfaces for disease 
transmission and to detect novel pathogens before 
widespread spillover occurs. These advances include 
improvements in information technology, molecular 
diagnostics, and risk modeling. Further advances 
in communications technology will serve to bring 
countries traditionally isolated from international 
health networks into the global fold. Developments 
over the past 15 years allow us to gather reports from 
disparate sources and use the Internet as a common 
platform for exchanging information. Examples 
include the Global Public Health Intelligence Network, 
the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases, and 
HealthMap (http://www.healthmap.org). The great-
est limitations of these networks are the underlying 
limitations of the national reporting systems and their 
bias towards English-speaking countries (Keller et al. 
2009). Telemedicine, or cell phone-mediated medi-
cal diagnoses, will allow technologically underserved 
areas to leapfrog ahead without enduring massive 
infrastructure changes, due in great part to the near-
ubiquitous use of cell phones in much of the develop-
ing world. Systems are now being created to allow 
medical care providers to text coded reports to be 
analyzed en masse (Yang et al. 2009). Similarly, moni-
toring the frequency of specific disease-related terms 
in daily Internet postings, search queries, or SMS text 
messages is now providing alternative forms of disease 
surveillance (Ginsberg et al. 2009). The extent to 
which telemedicine and the Internet decrease the dis-
parity between countries in regard to access to health 
information and capacity to detect EIDs remains to be 
seen, but our increased capacity to reach understudied 
areas suggests that this will be significant. 
Platforms for pathogen discovery and our ability to 
follow footprints ofinfectious agents require the labo-
ratory and computational infrastructure sufficiently 
powerful to dissect complex host-microbe interac-
tions. For example, MassTag PCR is a multiplex plat-
form that allows animal and human health specialists 
and epidemiologists to simultaneously test one sample 
for the presence of up to 30 different agents. MassTag 
PCR is a powerful tool for genomics, molecular virol-
ogy, computational biology, surveillance, pathogen 
discovery, outbreak detection, and epidemiological 
investigations (Lipkin 2010). 
CONCLLSIOI\S 
EIDs are a growing and complex threat to global 
public health. Diseases emerge when socioeconomic 
or environmental changes provide the optimal condi-
tions for pathogens to exploit new host populations, 
increase in pathogenicity, or otherwise amplify trans-
mission. We present a broad-scale, strategic approach 
for selecting geographic sites and species for sampling 
and then present a framework for making predictions 
about the future risk of EIDs from wildlife. In our 
view, the best approach to detecting and preventing 
the next emerging infectious disease before it becomes 
a pandemic threat is through building a broad coali-
tion of partners to discover, detect, and monitor dis-
eases at the wildlife-human interface using a localized, 
risk-based approach. These efforts can integrate pre-
dictive modeling, digital sensing, on-the-ground 
surveillance, and advanced molecular techniques at 
critical points for disease emergence, which then feed 
back to models for testing and refinement. 
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